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Accident frequency and unrealistic optimism: children’s assessment of risk 
 
Abstract 
Accidental injury is a major cause of mortality and morbidity among children, warranting 
research on their risk perceptions. Three hundred and seven children aged 10-11 years 
assessed the frequency, danger and personal risk likelihood of 8 accidents. Two social-
cognitive biases were manifested. The frequency of rare accidents (e.g. drowning) was 
overestimated, and the frequency of common accidents (e.g. bike accidents) underestimated; 
and the majority of children showed unrealistic optimism tending to see themselves as less 
likely to suffer these accidents in comparison to their peers, offering superior skills or 
parental control of the environment as an explanation. In the case of pedestrian accidents, 
children recognised their seriousness, underestimated the frequency of this risk and regarded 
their own road crossing skill as protection. These findings highlight the challenging task 
facing safety educators who, when teaching conventional safety knowledge and routines, also 
need to alert children to the danger of over-confidence without disabling them though fear. 
 
Keywords: primary school-age children, unrealistic optimism, risk perception, accidents, 
pedestrian           
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Accident frequency and unrealistic optimism: children’s assessment of risk 
1. Introduction  
Accidental injury is a major cause of mortality and morbidity, particularly among 
children and young people (Public Health England, 2014; Towner et al, 2005; WHO, 2008). 
In the UK in 2011, 165 children aged under 15 died as a result of unintentional injury, and 
annually one child in five attends an Accident and Emergency (A & E) department (Miskin, 
2013). Injury is not only costly to individuals and families but places a burden on the state 
(Lyons et al, 2011) as even a single visit to A & E in the UK involving no treatment costs the 
state £138 (Department of Health, 2016).    
Traffic accidents are a major cause of serious injury and death for children and are 
ranked as the second most frequent cause of death to 10-14 year olds world-wide (WHO, 
2008). Notwithstanding the roles of enforcement such as 20 mph zones and other traffic 
calming measures, education has always been regarded as an important component of injury 
minimisation and prevention strategies. Schools and safety centres commonly focus on skills 
such as road crossing codes, which list procedures to be followed for safe navigation of the 
environment (Lamb et al., 2006; Schwebel et al., 2012; Schwebel et al., 2016). 
Cognitive psychologists, however, have highlighted some of the barriers to effective 
use of these procedures. For example, children’s ability to cross a busy road safely is 
hampered by their inability to assess the speed of approaching vehicles (Wann et al., 2011). 
Further difficulties may arise from inappropriate assessment of the probability or severity of 
various accidents (Weinstein, 2000). Research with adults has shown that people tend to be 
over concerned with rare and ‘dreaded’ hazards (such as nuclear weapons accidents) at the 
expense of the more common and ‘mundane’ (such as auto accidents) (Slovic, 1987). 
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Adult respondents tend to over-estimate the frequency of death from rare causes, such 
as botulism or tornado, while under-estimating the frequency of death from common causes 
such stroke and heart disease (Lichtenstein et al., 1978) with the possible consequence that 
people underestimate the importance of the behaviour change required in respect of common 
but serious illnesses and hazards (Sheeran et al., 2013). One explanation of this bias is that 
the frequency of rare risks is over-estimated as instances easily come to mind (i.e. they are 
subject to the ‘availability heuristic’, Tversky & Kahneman; 1973) due in part to dramatic 
media coverage.  
Another bias which has been demonstrated to lessen people’s appreciation of risk is 
unrealistic optimism, i.e. the tendency for people to think that risks, including accidents, 
apply more to other people than to themselves (Shepperd et al., 2013; White et al., 2011).  
Some research suggests that children are also susceptible to unrealistic optimism (Whalen et 
al., 1994), although little of this research has looked at unrealistic optimism concerning 
accidents. 
This study seeks to investigate the underestimation and optimism biases in 10-11 year 
old children with respect to accidents as these biases, if present, are likely to impact on 
children’s execution of safety procedures. To our knowledge estimation (as assessed by 
Lichtenstein et al, 1978) and the Tversky & Kahneman (1973) approach to availability have 
not been investigated in children. While children of this age group are able to use statistical 
information to make social judgements and this increases in childhood (Jacobs & Klaczyski, 
2002) it remains an open question whether children show the same biases as adults 
(Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). This age group (10-11 year olds) was also chosen as this 
is when UK children are about to leave primary school and are likely to begin to walk or 
cycle unaccompanied to school and other destinations (Shaw et al, 2013), and is just prior to 
the age (12 years) when pedestrians are at most risk of accident (PACTS, 2013).        
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2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Primary schools in Oxfordshire, UK were contacted and 19/47 agreed to take part in 
the research. All children (N = 341) for whom parents gave consent (73%) were invited to 
take part. The analysis is based on 307 Year 6 children (143 boys and 164 girls, aged 10-11 
years) (34/341 children were not at school on the day of the study). See Supplementary 
Material available online for sample size calculation. The study was approved by the Oxford 
Brookes University Research Ethics Committee.  
     
2.2 Procedure and stimuli 
A one-to-one interview session opened with children looking at a series of 
commissioned cartoons depicting a day in the life of a 10 year old child which involved a 
variety of activities including potential hazards on the road, in school, and at home. This 
primed the children to think about risk. Eight specially drawn colour images on separate 
cards depicting accidents ‘about to happen’ were then presented to the children (see Figure 
1).     
 
  Children’s assessment of risk 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Images depicting accidents ‘about to happen’ 
 
These showed a sample of risks/hazards of varying frequencies which together 
constitute 21% of admissions to hospital via A& E for those aged 10 – 14 years, according to 
Public Health England Hospital Episode Statistics. The pictures were accompanied by a 
series of questions designed to measure children’s judgements about danger, frequency, and 
personal risk / unrealistic optimism. The eight pictures were given to the children in random 
order and they were asked to identify the nature of the ‘accident about to happen’ before 
making a series of judgements described below.  
 
2.2.1 Danger judgement 
The children ranked the images by how dangerous and harmful such an accident 
would be.  This measure was designed to capture Slovic’s (1987) notion of ‘dreaded’ risks.   
 
  Children’s assessment of risk 
 
7 
 
2.2.2 Frequency judgement I  
The children ranked the same images for frequency, i.e. assessing how often these 
accidents happen to children their age. 
 
2.2.3 Frequency judgement II 
A second measure of frequency (designed to allow the expression of absolute rather 
than ranked frequency) required the children to imagine that they were a doctor who comes to 
work after a few weeks holiday to find that 50 children aged around 10-11 years had been 
admitted to the hospital with sufficiently bad injuries that they need to stay in hospital for a 
while. The children were asked to allocate cut-outs of people to the images (still in the order 
previously sorted by them for frequency) to show how many of the 50 children have had each 
kind of accident. If a child asked whether each accident had to have some admissions, they 
were told that it was OK for some accidents to have no admissions. The development of this 
measure is described in the Supplementary Material.    
 
2.2.4 Personal risk / Unrealistic optimism 
Children were asked to decide for each of the eight accidents whether there was less, 
more, or the same chance of this accident happening to them in comparison to other children 
of their age (Shepperd et al., 2015).  On every occasion that a child responded with ‘less 
likely’ they were asked to give their reasoning. The explanations were categorised into 
references to protective factors such as their own skill or lack of exposure to the risk due, for 
example, to adult control of the situation. 
 
2.2.5 Risk availability 
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For adults the traditional method for assessing ‘availability’ has involved media 
coverage (Lichtenstien et al, 1978). As this approach is not appropriate for use with children, 
we chose to instead to elicit which accidents the children in our sample viewed as 
‘sensational’ (as a proxy for ‘availability’). Each child was asked to nominate from among 
the eight accidents which one they would use if they had to write a ‘very thrilling and 
exciting story’ involving an accident. For full details of interview see Supplementary 
Material. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Danger 
Children rated pedestrian accidents more dangerous than any of the other accidents 
and significantly more dangerous than the two considered as the next most dangerous, 
namely drowning and being hit by lightning (as established by planned comparisons of means 
following analysis of variance, see Table 1, F=827.30, df 7,299, p<.001, η2 =.951).  There 
was a trend towards accidents rated as more dangerous being judged as less frequent: r(6) = - 
.66, p = .076. The exception to the high danger/low frequency perception was pedestrian 
accidents which were seen as the most dangerous of all accidents, but ranked as of middle 
frequency. 
 
3.2 Children’s judgement of frequency of different kinds of accident 
Children’s 1-8 ranking of the frequency of the accidents approximated to actual 
hospital admissions: r(6) = -.87, p = .005. When asked to assess frequency by allocating the 
expected number of admissions of children their age to hospital via Accident and Emergency, 
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the rank ordering showed similarly close correspondence with actual admissions: r(6) = -.88, 
p = .004. However, overall rank ordering does not reflect distance between scores and 
obscures the fact that if the scores are compared to each other individually the frequency of 
pedestrian accidents, dog bites and burns were judged to be similar both in terms of 
frequency rankings and imagined hospital admissions (F=387.91, df 7,299, p<001, η2 =.901, 
see Table 1).   
Table 1 also shows the differences between children’s estimations of the proportion 
hospital admissions for each accident type (F = 150.75, df 7, 299, p <.001 η2=.331).  
Although it could be thought that asking children to allocate counters to each of the eight 
accident types may have given children the impression that they had to allocate counters to 
each accident type, in fact 12% (36/307) of children allocated zero counters to one or more of 
the accident types.  Each accident type was on occasion allocated zero counters – with this 
being most frequent in the case of being struck by lightning to which 30 children allocated 
zero counters (and the average number of counters in this case were 2.52 (sd 1.89) (i.e. 5% of 
the total), and the modal response was 1.0, given by 81/307 children) (i.e. 2% of the total), 
and least frequent in the case of bike accident where only one child allocated zero counters to 
this accident (with the average being  9.33 (sd 3.33) (i.e. 19% of the total), and the modal 
response was 10 (i.e 20% of the total), given by 49/307 children).   
 
Children judge the frequency of burns, dog bites and pedestrian accidents to be 
similar in frequency using this different method of assessment. Figure 2 plots the actual 
proportional frequency of the eight accidents versus children’s estimations of those accidents 
in absolute terms. The difference between real and perceived frequency was compared to zero 
using single sample t tests (see Table S2 in Supplementary Material). In each case the 
difference was significant, showing that the children over-estimated the occurrence of the 
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five low frequency events and underestimated the occurrence of the three high frequency 
events. Dog bites, burns, electrical accidents, drowning and being hit by lightning were 
overestimated, on average, by 7.73%, 95% CI [7.63, 8.08], while bike, trampoline and 
pedestrian accidents were underestimated, on average, by 12.88%, 95% CI [12.29, 13.03] 
(paired t(306) = 67.85, p <.001, d = 3.87), see Supplementary Material Table S2. 
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Table 1 Risks: Danger and Frequency Judgements  
Accident type Admissions to hospital 
via A & E 
As viewed by children 
N = 307 
  Danger Frequency 
 WHO 
ICD-10 
Codes (causes) 
N As %* Average rank+  
(low number = high 
danger) 
Average rank+ 
(low number = high 
frequency) 
Perceived hospital 
admissions+ 
    Mean 95% CI Mean 
 
95% CI Mean% 95% CI 
Bike V12-19 1645 37.10% 5.50d 5.33, 5.66 2.25a 2.10, 2.41 19%a 18, 19% 
Trampoline   W09** 1291 29.12% 6.68e 6.54, 6.81 2.60b 2.42, 2.78 17%b 16, 18% 
Pedestrian V03-09 994 22.42% 2.20a 2.06, 2.34 4.06c 3.82, 4.29 14%c 13, 15% 
Dog bite W54 323 7.28% 6.95e 6.81, 7.10 3.97c 3.76, 4.18 13%c 13, 14% 
Burns X10-12,15,19 150 3.38% 5.58d 5.40, 5.75 4.48c 4.27, 4.69 13%c 12, 14% 
Electrical W86, 87 16 0.36% 3.53c 3.35, 3.71 5.75d 5.58, 5.91 9%d 9, 10% 
Drowning W69-74 13 0.29% 2.82b 2.66, 3.00 5.55d 5.36, 5.75 10%d 9, 10% 
Lightning X33 1 0.02% 2.73b 2.55, 2.93 7.32e 7.18, 7.45 5%e 4, 5% 
*  As a % of those 8 accidents, as admitted via Accident & Emergency, 2012/13, Aged 10-14 only, Hospital Episode Statistics  (N = 4433)  
(Total admissions via A & E for this age group = 20,954 – excluding self-harm, assault, sequelae of medical procedures.) 
Cause codes of admissions via A & E are used rather than codes at A & E attendance as the latter are unreliable due to 35% or more of records having 
no codes. See http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB19124.    
** W09 refers to falls ‘on or from playground equipment’. A recent local survey suggests these are predominantly trampoline injuries (Taylor, 2015).   
+  Vertical non-shared superscript indicates significant differences between values established via paired comparisons at p <.01 
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Figure 2 Actual and perceived frequency judgements by accident type 
 
Table 2 Personal risk judgements 
 
Accident type As viewed by children            
N = 307 
 Less likely to 
happen to me  
More likely to 
happen to me 
Ratio of less to 
more likely+ 
% use of skill for 
reduced personal 
risk (among those 
who regarded it 
as less likely to 
happen to them)+  
Bike 36.20% 19.90% 1.82c 42.20%c 
Trampoline   44.20% 20.65% 2.14c 6.80%d 
Pedestrian 53.10% 3.30% 16.09a 76.30%a 
Dog bite 57.37% 12.40% 4.63b 63.10%b 
Burns 42.60% 17.70% 2.41c 28.80%c 
Electrical 78.30% 4.59% 17.06a 37.80%c 
Drowning 61.30% 6.50% 9.43a 77.20%a 
Lightning 63.90% 5.20% 12.29a 33.50%c 
+   non-shared superscript indicates significant differences between values established via 
x2 paired comparisons at p <.01 
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3.3 Children’s optimism 
In response to being asked if the accident was ‘same likelihood’, ‘less likely’ or ‘more 
likely’ to happen to them, on average children gave 4 optimistic/less likely responses, M  = 
4.38, 95% CI [4.20, 4.56]; 1 pessimistic/more likely response, M = 0.90, 95% CI [0.79, 1.02], 
and 3 same likelihood responses, M = 2.72, 95% CI [2.56, 2.87]. Thus the most common 
response was to judge the accident as less likely to happen to the self than to others of the 
same age. However, the extent of children’s optimism varied depending on the specific 
accident.  Optimism was related to both true frequency (r(6) = -.73, p = .040) and perceived 
frequency (r(6) = -.81, p = .016). The three accidents with low frequencies are characterised 
by high levels of optimism. Optimism that the accident will not happen to the self in 
comparison to other children their age was expressed by 78% of children for electrical 
accidents, 64% for lightning, and 61% for near drowning. The four most dangerous accidents 
according to the children (pedestrian accidents, being struck by lightning, being electrocuted 
and drowning) were judged as significantly ‘less likely to happen to me’ than the less 
dangerous accidents (paired t (306) = 9.31, p <.001). Table 2 shows the ratio between 
children reporting these accidents being ‘less’ and ‘more likely to happen to me’. For the 
most dangerous four accidents, on average, the number of children regarding them as ‘less 
likely to happen to me’ is 13 times greater than the number of children who report that they 
are ‘more likely to happen to me’.   
When children report themselves as less likely to experience an accident than other 
children they either describe themselves as having the skills to mitigate the risk or they regard 
themselves as not exposed to risk, usually because they are ‘not allowed’ to do something or 
are otherwise protected by adult action (see Table 2).  Among the high frequency accidents, 
pedestrian and trampoline accidents show different patterns of response. In the case of 
pedestrian accidents, children rarely think this accident is more likely to happen to them than 
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to other children and references to skill account for 76% of the explanations given (e.g. ‘I am 
very careful/ I have practiced crossing the road / I would always look’).  This is in contrast to 
the relatively small number of children who refer to lack of opportunity/others’ control of the 
environment, (e.g. having an adult with them when they cross the road).  In the case of a 
trampoline accident, 44% thought it less likely to happen to them, but only 7% of them 
attributed this to their skill, with the remainder thinking they were not at risk due to adult 
control of the environment – such as ‘we have a net around our trampoline’. 
In the case of low frequency accidents (drowning, lightning), both show high levels of 
optimism but for different reasons. In the case of drowning, 77% of those claiming to be less 
likely to experience this accident referred to skills such as having done a life savers’ course or 
being able to swim very well.  In contrast, skill plays little part in children’s explanation of 
why they are less likely to be struck by lightning than other children. Although 64% of 
children are optimistic, only 34% attribute not being struck by lightning to their own 
skill/knowledge and the remainder refer to parental control (such as ‘not being allowed out in 
a storm’). 
 
3.4 Risk availability 
In order to estimate the availability of the eight accidents the children were asked to 
pick an accident which they could feature in a thrilling and exciting story. 38% of children 
nominated a lightning accident, and 34% nominated a drowning accident as being the 
accident which would help make a story dramatic. The only other accident to be nominated 
by more than 10% of children as dramatic was the pedestrian accident, nominated by 18%. 
Those who nominated the pedestrian accident as dramatic were more likely to allocate more 
admissions to this kind of accident than did other children, and saw pedestrian accidents as 
similar in admission rate (16%) as those due to bike (19%) and trampoline (17%) accidents, 
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and higher than those due to dog-bite (12%), paired t(54) = 2.51, p = .015, d = 0.53, or due to 
burn injuries accidents (11%), paired t(54) = 3.39, p = .001, d = 0.66. 
 
3.5 Gender 
Since males are over-represented in accident figures in many domains (Fauth and 
Ellis, 2010) for each accident the frequency and danger judgment data were examined for 
gender differences and none were found. Nor were gender differences found on overall 
optimism (i.e. citation of ‘less likely’/ 8 accidents: males M = 4.39, 95% CI [4.11, 4.66], 
females M = 4.37, 95% CI [4.13, 4.61], t(305) = 0.10, p > .250, or on use of skill as an 
explanation: males M = 1.87, 95% CI [1.63, 2.11], females M = 2.06, 95% CI [1.81, 2.29], 
t(305) = 1.06, p > .250. See Supplementary Material Table S3 for details. The study was not 
able to include a measure of socio-economic status at an individual level.      
 
4.      Discussion 
4.1 Findings 
The study investigated whether children are subject to the same risk assessment biases 
shown by adults in previous research (qv. Lichtenstein et al., 1978). In reference to the eight 
accidents presented, children overestimated the frequencies of rare accidents/injuries and 
underestimated the frequencies of more common accident/injuries. As the two rarest 
injuries/accidents (being struck by lightning and near-drowning) were also nominated as the 
most ‘thrilling and exciting’ accidents, this lends credence to the proposition that the 
sensational aspect of an injury/accident plays a part in its availability and consequent over-
estimation (Lichtenstein et al, 1978). This is also supported by the fact that the children who 
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nominated a pedestrian accident as dramatic and sensational were less subject than the rest of 
the children to underestimate its occurrence.  
Children showed optimistic bias. Those estimating their own risk as less than their 
peers far outnumbered those who estimated their own risk as greater than their peers. 
Children’s explanations for why they are less likely to experience an accident in comparison 
to their peers provide insight into their ideas about accident causation. They justified their 
optimism by referring to their own skill or to others’ control of their environment (e.g.  ‘I am 
not allowed to ride my bike on the road’, or ‘We haven’t got any electrical sockets in the 
bathroom’). That the use of skill as an explanation varied by type of accident suggests its use 
was not primarily related to the need to present themselves as responsible to the adult 
researcher. Children’s references to their own skills as a way in which they mitigate risk are 
evidence of their empowerment.  However, this has the danger of potentially leading to a 
false sense of security. Pedestrian accidents have a high objective frequency and are accidents 
which children rate as dangerous, yet whose frequency children underestimate. Hospital 
admissions due to pedestrian accidents were judged by the majority of children as having the 
same frequency as dog-bite injury (despite being 3 times more common) and burn injury 
(despite being 6 times more common).  
Trampoline accidents, which are increasingly common (Kasmire et al., 2016), are 
judged as the second most frequent accident and judged alongside dog-bite as being the least 
dangerous. Children who stated that this accident would be less likely to happen to them in 
comparison to their peers reasoned that it would not happen to them as ‘they had a net around 
their trampoline’. Comments such as this illustrate two points. Firstly, they indicate that 
children think that falling off is the key danger, and do not appear to recognise other causes 
of trampoline injuries (Mulligan et al., 2016). In one survey of trampoline injuries presenting 
to a children’s emergency department, 68% of the children sustained their injuries on the 
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trampoline itself – for example by colliding either with other children using the trampoline at 
the same time and/or by impacting with the frame and springs within the safety net itself 
(Wootton and Harris, 2009). Secondly, they make clear that children are prompted to think 
about accidents in a real world context, beyond the specifics of the illustration.  
 
4.2 Limitations 
A limitation of this research is that it addressed children’s perceptions of a restricted 
number of risks, although these eight risks accounted for one in five of coded hospital 
accident admissions for the age group. The study’s strengths lie in its method, including two 
measures of frequency (one of which was innovative), and following Weinstein (2000), 
measuring both perceived probability and severity/danger. In addition, the absolute measure 
of frequency which involved assigning tokens to indicate frequency of accident types may 
have encouraged children to believe that they had to give one or more tokens to each type. 
However, 12% of the children did assign zero to one or more categories.        
  
5. Conclusion       
Frequency underestimation and optimism biases need to be addressed to enhance 
safety education. In this study children not only underestimated the likelihood of a pedestrian 
accident but this accident was also subject to one of the highest levels of assumed skill. Given 
the difficulty in reducing the power of optimism biases (Horswill et al., 2004), children not 
only need the skills current safety training develops, but also different skills. Risk awareness 
needs to be raised without incapacitating children by rendering them over-fearful (Witte and 
Allen, 2000).  Instruction needs not only to teach routines, such as the Green Cross Code, but 
also alert children to circumstances in which they might be less skilful than they think they 
are, resulting in momentary abandonment of safe behaviour. Examples could include being in 
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a hurry, talking on a mobile (Violano et al., 2015) or playing Pokémon Go. This potential loss 
of situational awareness may best be addressed by enhancing children’s ability to monitor the 
execution of their risk-management skills (Schneider, 2008). 
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